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Abstract—Using social media for political discourse is increas-
ingly becoming common practice, especially around election time.
Arguably, one of the most interesting aspects of this trend is the
possibility of “pulsing” the public’s opinion in near real-time and,
thus, it has attracted the interest of many researchers as well as
news organizations. Recently, it has been reported that predicting
electoral outcomes from social media data is feasible, in fact it is
quite simple to compute. Positive results have been reported in a
few occasions, but without an analysis on what principle enables
them. This, however, should be surprising given the significant
differences in the demographics between likely voters and users
of online social networks.
This work aims to test the predictive power of social media
metrics against several Senate races of the two recent US Con-
gressional elections. We review the findings of other researchers
and we try to duplicate their findings both in terms of data
volume and sentiment analysis. Our research aim is to shed light
on why predictions of electoral (or other social events) using
social media might or might not be feasible. In this paper, we
offer two conclusions and a proposal: First, we find that electoral
predictions using the published research methods on Twitter
data are not better than chance. Second, we reveal some major
challenges that limit the predictability of election results through
data from social media. We propose a set of standards that any
theory aiming to predict elections (or other social events) using
social media should follow.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the use of social media for communication
has dramatically increased. Research has shown that 22% of
adult internet users were engaged with the political campaign
on Twitter, Facebook and Myspace in the months leading
up to the November 2010 US elections [1]. Empowered by
the APIs that many social media companies make available,
researchers are engaged in an effort to analyze and make
sense of the data collected through these social communication
channels. Theoretically, social media data, if used correctly,
can lead to predictions of events in the near future influenced
by human behavior. In fact, to describe this phenomenon,
[2] talk about “predicting the future” while [3] have coined
the term “predicting the present”. In fact, researchers have
reported that the volume of Twitter chat over time can be
used to predict several kinds of consumer metrics such as the
likelihood of success of new movies before their release [2]
and the marketability of consumer goods [4]. These predictions
are explained by the perceived ability of Twitter chat volume
and Google Search Trends to monitor and record general social
trends as they occur.
Being able to make predictions based on publicly available
data would have numerous benefits in areas such as health (e.g.
predictions of flu epidemics [5], [6]), business (e.g., prediction
of box-office success of movies [7] and product marketability
[4]), economics (e.g., predictions on stock market trends and
housing market trends [3], [8], [9]), and politics (e.g., trends
in public opinion [10]), to name a few.
However, there have also been reports on Twitter’s ability to
predict with amazing accuracy the voting results in the recent
2009 German elections [11] and in the 2010 US Congressional
elections [12]. Given the significant differences in the demo-
graphics between likely voters and users of social networks [1]
questions arise on what is the underlying operating principle
enabling these predictions. Could it be simply a matter of
coincidence or is there a reason why general trends are as
accurate as specific demographics? Should we expect these
methods to be accurate again in future elections? These are
the questions we seek to address with our work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next
section II reviews past research on electoral predictions using
social media data. Section III describes a number of new
experiments we conducted testing the predictability of the last
two rounds of US elections based on Twitter volume and
sentiment analysis. Section IV describes a set of standards
that any methodology of electoral predictions should follow
in order to be consistently competent against the statistical
sampling methods employed by professional pollsters. The
final section V has our conclusions and proposes new lines
of research.
II. PREDICTING PAST ELECTIONS
In the previous section we mentioned some of the attempts
to use Twitter and Google Trends for predictions of real
world outcomes and external market events. What about the
important area of elections? One would expect that, following
the previous research literature (e.g. [11], [12]), and given the
high utilization that the Web and online social networks have
in the US [1], Twitter volume should be have been able to
predict consistently the outcomes of the US Congressional
elections. Let us examine the instances and methods that
have been used in the past in the claims of electoral results
predictions and discuss their predictive power.
A. Claims that Social Media Data predicted elections
The word “prediction” means foreseeing the outcome of
events that have not yet occurred. In this sense, the authors
are not aware of any publications or claims that, using social
media data, someone was able to propose a method that would
predict correctly and consistently the results of elections before
the elections happened. What has happened, however, is that
on several occasions, post processing of social media data
has resulted in claims that they might had been able to make
correct electoral predictions. Such claims are discussed in the
following subsection.
B. Claims that Social Media Data could have predicted elec-
tions
Probably due to the promising results achieved by many of
the projects and studies discussed in the section I, there is a
relatively high amount of hype surrounding the feasibility of
predicting electoral results using social media. It must be noted
that most of that hype is fueled by traditional media and blogs,
usually bursting prior and after electoral events. For example,
shortly after the recent 2010 elections in the US, flamboyant
statements made it to the news media headlines. From those
arguing that Twitter is not a reliable predictor (e.g. [13]) to
those claiming just the opposite, that Twitter (and Facebook)
was remarkably accurate (e.g. [14]). Moreover, the degree of
accuracy of these “predictions” was usually assessed in terms
of percentage of correctly guessed electoral races – e.g., the
winners of 74% for the US House and 81% for the US Senate
races were predicted [15] – without further qualification. Such
qualifications are important since a few US races are won
by very tight margins, while most of them are won with
comfortable margins. These predictions were not compared
against traditional ways of prediction, such as professional
polling methods, or even trivial prediction methods based on
incumbency (the fact that those who are already in office are
far more likely to be re-elected in the US).
Compared to the media coverage, the number of scholarly
works on the feasibility of predicting popular opinion and
elections from social media is relatively small. Nevertheless,
it does tend to support a positive opinion on the predictive
power of social media as a promising line of research, while
exposing some caveats of the methods. Thus, according to
[16], the number of Facebook fans for election candidates had
a measurable influence on their respective vote shares. These
researchers assert that “social network support, on Facebook
specifically, constitutes an indicator of candidate viability of
significant importance [...] for both the general electorate and
even more so for the youngest age demographic.”
A study of a different kind was conducted by [10]. They
analyzed the way in which simple sentiment analysis methods
could be applied to tweets as a tool of automatically pulsing
public opinion. These researchers correlated the output of such
a tool with the temporal evolution of different indices such as
the index of Consumer Sentiment, the index of Presidential
Job Approval, and several pre-electoral polls for the US 2008
Presidential Race. The correlation with the first two indices
was rather high but it was not significant for the pre-electoral
polls, and they conclude that sentiment analysis on Twitter data
seems to be a promising field of research to replace traditional
polls although, they find, it’s not quite there yet.
The work by [11] focuses directly on whether Twitter
can serve as a predictor of electoral results. In that paper,
a strong statement is made about predictability, namely that
“the mere number of tweets mentioning a political party can
be considered a plausible reflection of the vote share and
its predictive power even comes close to traditional election
polls.” In fact, they report a mean average error (MAE) of only
1.65%. Moreover, these researchers found that co-occurrence
of political party mentions accurately reflected close political
positions between political parties and plausible coalitions.
More recently, [12] used the Tweets sent by the electoral
candidates, not the general public, and reported success in
“building a model that predicts whether a candidate will win or
lose with accuracy of 88.0%”. While this concluding statement
seems strong, a closer look in the claims reveals that they
found their model to be less successful, as they admit that
“applying this technique, we correctly predict 49 out of 63
(77.7%) of the races”.
C. Claims that Social Media Data did not predict the elections
The previous subsection reveals some inconsistencies with
electoral predictions in scholarly publications. While candi-
date counts of Twitter messages predicted with remarkable
accuracy electoral results in Germany in 2009 [11], a more
elaborated method did not correlate well with pre-electoral
polls in the US 2008 Presidential elections [10]. Could it be
that some of those results were just a matter of chance or the
side-effect of technical problems? Who is right?
The work by [17] focuses on the use of Google search
volume (not Twitter) as a predictor for the 2008 and 2010
US Congressional elections. They divided the electoral races
in groups depending on the degree they were contested by
the candidates, and they find that only a few groups of races
were “predicted” above chance using Google Trends – in one
case achieving 81% of correct results. However, they report
that those promising results were achieved by chance: while
the best group’s predictions were good in 2008 (81%), for the
same group the predictions were very poor in 2010 (34%).
Importantly, even when the predictions were better than
chance, they were not competent compared to the trivial
method of predicting through incumbency. For example, in
2008, 91.6% of the races were won by incumbents. Even
in 2010, in elections with major public discontent, 84.5% of
the races, were won by incumbents. Given that, historically,
the incumbent candidate gets re-elected about 9 out of 10
times, the baseline for any competent predictor should be
the incumbent re-election rate. According to such a baseline,
Google search volume proves to be a poor electoral predic-
tor. Compared to professional pollsters (e.g., The New York
Times), the predictions were far worse; and, in some groups
of races the predictions were even worse than chance!
In [18], the sentiment analysis methods of [10] and [11] are
applied to tweets obtained during the US 2008 Presidential
elections (Obama vs. McCain). [18] assigned a voting inten-
tion to every individual user in the dataset, along with the
user’s geographical location. Thus, electoral predictions were
computed for different states instead of simply the whole of
the US, and found that every method examined would have
largely overestimated Obama’s victory, predicting (incorrectly)
that Obama would have won even in Texas. In addition, [18]
provides some suggestions on the way in which such data
could be filtered to improve prediction accuracy. In this sense,
it points out that demographic bias in the user base of Twitter
and other social media services is an important electoral factor
and, therefore, bias in data should be corrected according to
user demographic profiles.
Recently, [19] provided a thorough response to the work of
[11] arguing that those authors relied on a number of arbitrary
choices which make their method virtually useless for future
elections. They point out that, by taking into account all of the
parties running for the elections, the method by [11] would
actually have predicted a victory for the Piratenpartei (Pirate
Party) (which received 2% of the votes but no seats in the
German parliament).
In this paper we decided to examine closer the claims
of electoral predictions described in the previous subsection.
Since we had collected data Twitter data from the US Con-
gressional Elections in 2010, we were in a position to examine
whether the methods proposed were as successful in instances
other than the ones they were developed for. Moreover, we
wanted to analyze why would electoral predictions using social
media may (or may not) be possible. In the next section III
we describe our computational experiments and in section IV
we analyze the operating models behind electoral predictions.
III. NEW EXPERIMENTS ON TWITTER AND ELECTIONS
For our study, we used two data sets related to elections that
took place in the US during 2010. Predictions were calculated
based on Twitter chatter volume, as in [11], and then based on
sentiment analysis of tweets, in ways similar to [10]. While
we did not have comparable data to examine the methods of
[12], we discuss some of its findings in the next section.
The first data set we used belongs to the 2010 US Sen-
ate special election in Massachusetts (“MAsen10”), a highly
contested race between Martha Coakley (D) and Scott Brown
(R). The data set contains 234,697 tweets contributed by
56,165 different Twitter accounts, collected with the use of
Twitter streaming API, configured to retrieve near real-time
tweets containing the names of any of the two candidates. The
collection took place from January 13 to January 20, 2010, the
day after the elections.
The second data set contains all the tweets provided by
the Twitter “gardenhose” in the week from October 26 to
November 1, the day before the general US Congressional
elections in November 2, 2010 (“USsen10”). The gardenhose
provides a uniform sampling of the Twitter data. The daily
snapshots contained between 5.6 and 7.7 million tweets. Using
the names of candidates for five highly contested races for the
US Senate, 13,019 tweets were collected, contributed by 6,970
different Twitter accounts.
These two datasets are different. The MAsen10 is an almost
complete set of tweets, while USsen10 provides a random
sample, but because of its randomness, it should accurately
represent the volume and nature of tweets during that pre-
election week.
The first prediction method we examined is the one de-
scribed by [11], which consists of counting the number of
tweets mentioning each candidate. According to that study, the
proportion of tweets mentioning each candidate should closely
reflect the actual vote share in the election. Tweets containing
the names of both candidates were not included, focusing only
on tweets mentioning one candidate at a time.
The second prediction method extends the ideas from [10],
which described a way to compute a sentiment score for a
topic being discussed on Twitter. To that end, [10] relied
on the subjectivity lexicon collected by [20] and labeled
tweets containing any positive word as positive tweets, and
the ones containing any negative word as negative tweets.
Then, the sentiment score is defined to be the ratio between the
number of positive and negative tweets. It must be noted that,
according to [10], the number of polarized words in the tweet
is not important, and tweets can be simultaneously considered
as positive and negative. In addition, sentiment scores for
topics with very different volumes of tweets are not easily
comparable. Because of these issues, some changes had to be
made to [10]’s approach in order to compute predicted vote
shares. In our study, the lexicon employed is also [20], but
tweets are considered either positive or negative but not both.
Every tweet is labeled as positive, negative, or neutral, based
on the sum of such labeled words (positive words contribute
+1, while negative words contribute -1). A tweet might be
labeled neutral when the sum of polarized words is 0, or
when no contributing words appeared in it. Given the two-
party nature of the races, the vote share is calculated with this
formula:
vote share(c1) =
pos(c1) + neg(c2)
pos(c1) + neg(c1) + pos(c2) + neg(c2)
(1)
where c1 is the candidate for whom support is being com-
puted while c2 is the opposing candidate; pos(c) and neg(c)
are, respectively, the number of positive and negative tweets
mentioning candidate c.
A. Results of Applying the Prediction Methods
For the MAsen10 data it was possible to make a more
detailed analysis, since the data contained tweets before the
election day (6 days of data), the election day (20 hours of
data), and post-election (10 hours of data). The 47,368 tweets
that mentioned both candidates were not used.
Table I shows the number of tweets mentioning each candi-
date and the election results predicted from the volume. The
total count of tweets we collected (53.25% - 46.75% in favor
of Brown) reflects closely the election outcome (Brown 51.9%
- Coakley 47.1%). Correct prediction?
Coakley Brown
#tweets % #tweets %
Pre-elec. (6 days) 52,116 53.86 44,654 46.14
Elec. day (20 hrs) 21,076 49.94 21,123 50.06
Post-elec. (10 hrs) 14,381 29.74 33,979 70.26
Total 87,573 46.75 99,756 53.25
TABLE I
THE SHARE OF TWEETS FOR EACH CANDIDATE IN THE MASEN10 DATA
SET. NOTICE THAT THE PRE-ELECTION SHARE DIDN’T PREDICT THE FINAL
RESULT (BROWN WON 51.9% OF THE VOTES).
Coakley Brown
Pre-election 46.5% 53.5%
Election-day 44.25% 55.8%
Post-election 27.2% 72.8%
All 41.0% 59.0%
TABLE II
PREDICTIONS BASED ON VOTE SHARE FOR MASEN10 DATA SET BASED ON
SENTIMENT ANALYSIS. THE PRE-ELECTION PREDICTION CORRECTLY
PREDICTS BROWN AS THE WINNER WITH A SMALL ERROR (1.1% FOR
CORRECTED ELECTION RESULTS, ALSO SEE TABLE III).
We refrained from declaring victory in the predictive power
of Twitter when we realized that the share volume for the
pre-election period, actually predicted a win for Coakley,
not Brown. Table I also shows how the number of tweets
was affected by electoral events. Brown received 1/3 of all
his mentions in the 10 hours post-election, when everyone
started talking about his win, an important win that would
have repercussions for the health care reform, a major issue
at the time. Brown’s win broke the filibuster-proof power of
democrats in the US Senate and produced a lot of tweets.
While the simple Twitter share of pre-election tweets
couldn’t predict the result of the MAsen10 election, applying
sentiment analysis to tweets and calculating the vote share
with Equation (1), comes close to electoral results, as shown
in Table II. For a second time in our research effort we re-
frained from declaring victory in Twitter’s power in predicting
elections, and decided to take a closer look in our data.
The two prediction methods were further applied to 5 other
highly contested senate races from the USsen10 data set. The
results of the 6 races are summarized in Table III. The actual
results of the election don’t always sum up to 100% because
in a few races more than two candidates participated. So, in
order to calculate the mean average error (MAE), the results
were normalized to sum up to 100%. Using the values of
the corrected election results, MAE values were calculated
for both methods. The Twitter volume method had an error of
17.1%, while the sentiment analysis had an error of 7.6%. In
other words, both MAE values are unacceptably high. Each
method was able to correctly predict the winner in only half
of the races.
B. Sentiment Analysis Accuracy
The result in Table III show that while both prediction
methods are correct only half of the time, MAE is smaller for
POS NEG NEUT Accuracy
opposing Brown 124 76 150 21.71%
opposing Coakley 70 67 105 27.68%
supporting Brown 216 45 254 41.94%
supporting Coakley 240 72 213 45.71%
neutral 249 82 296 47.20%
36.85%
TABLE IV
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE AUTOMATIC
SENTIMENT ANALYSIS COMPUTED AGAINST A MANUALLY LABELED SET
OF TWEETS.
the sentiment analysis method. This difference was intriguing
and we decided to study it closer. While a thorough evaluation
of the accuracy of sentiment analysis regarding political con-
versation is out of the scope of this paper, some evidence on
the issues affecting simple methods based on polarity lexicons
is provided from three different angles:
1) Compared against manually labeled tweets: To evalu-
ate the accuracy of the above described sentiment analysis
method, a set of tweets were manually assigned to one of
the following labels: opposing Brown, opposing Coakley,
supporting Brown, supporting Coakley, or neutral. This set of
tweets was chosen to reflect “one tweet, one vote”: From the
set of Twitter users that had indicated their location in the state
of Massachusetts, we chose users with a single tweet in the
corpus. This set contains 2,259 tweets. We read the tweets and
manually assigned labels to them. Our labels were compared
against those assigned by the automatic method, producing the
confusion matrix in Table IV.
The results show that the accuracy of the sentiment analysis
is only 36.85%, slightly better than a classifier randomly as-
signing the same three labels (positive, negative, and neutral).
2) Effect of misleading propaganda: A second evaluation
was performed on a particular set of tweets, namely those in-
cluded in a “Twitter bomb” targeted at Coakley [21] containing
a series of tweets spreading misleading information about her.
The corpus used in this study contained 925 tweets that were
part of such the Twitter bomb. According to the automatic
sentiment analysis, 369 of them were positive messages, 212
were neutral, and only 344 were negative. While all of these
tweets were part of an orchestrated smearing campaign against
Coakley, most of them were characterized as neutral or even
positive by the automatic sentiment analysis.
Therefore, we conclude that by just relying on polarity
lexicons the subtleties of propaganda and disinformation are
not only missed but even wrongly interpreted.
3) Relation to presumed political leaning: Finally, an ad-
ditional experiment was conducted to test the assumption
underlying this application of sentiment analysis, namely, that
the political preference of users can be derived from their
tweets. To derive the political preference from the tweets, for
every user, the corresponding tweets were grouped together
and their accumulated polarity score was attributed to the user.
The presumed political orientation of a user was calculated
following the approach described by [22]. This approach
State Senate Race Election Result Normalized Result Twitter Volume Sentiment Analysis
MA Coakley [D] vs. Brown[R] 47.1% - 51.9% 47.6% - 52.4% 53.9% - 46.1% 46.5% - 53.5%
CO Bennet [D] vs Buck [R] 48.1% - 46.4% 50.9% - 49.1% 26.3% - 73.7% 63.3% - 36.7%
NV Reid [D] vs Angle [R] 50.3% - 44.5% 53.1% - 46.9% 51.2% - 48.8% 48.4% - 51.6%
CA Boxer [D] vs Fiorina [R] 52.2% - 44.2% 54.1% - 45.9% 57.9% - 42.1% 47.8% - 52.2%
KY Conway [D] vs Paul [R] 44.3% - 55.7% 44.3% - 55.7% 4.7% - 95.3% 43.1% - 56.9%
DE Coons [D] vs O’Donnell [R] 56.6% - 40.0% 58.6% - 41.4% 32.1% - 67.9% 38.8% - 61.2%
TABLE III
THE SUMMARY OF ELECTORAL AND PREDICTED RESULTS FOR 6 HIGHLY CONTESTED SENATE RACES. NUMBERS IN BOLD SHOW RACES WHERE THE
WINNER WAS PREDICTED CORRECTLY BY THE TECHNIQUE. BOTH TWITTER VOLUME AND SENTIMENT ANALYSIS METHODS WERE ABLE TO PREDICT
CORRECTLY 50% OF THE RACES. IN THIS SAMPLE, INCUMBENTS WON IN ALL THE RACES THEY RUN (NV, CA, CO), AND 84.5% OF ALL 2010 RACES.
makes use of the ADA scores, which range from 0 (most
conservative) to 100 (most liberal). ADA (Americans for
Democratic Action) is a liberal, political think-tank that pub-
lishes scores for each member of the US Congress according
to their voting record in key progressive issues. Official Twitter
accounts for 210 members of the House and 68 members of the
Senate were collected. Then, the Twitter followers of all these
accounts were collected, and every user received the average
ADA score of the Congress members it was following. The
number of Twitter users following the above mentioned 278
Congress members is roughly half a million. A little more than
14 thousand of them also appear in the MAsen10 dataset, and
they are used in the following correlation analysis.
For each of these 14 thousand users four different scores
are computed: their ADA score which, purportedly, would
reflect their political leaning, their opinion on Brown, their
opinion on Coakley, and their “voting orientation” for this
particular election. The voting orientation is defined as the
result of subtracting the opinion on Coakley from the opinion
on Brown. Given the range of the ADA scores and the sign
of the rest of the scores, the correlations between them should
be as follows. The correlation between ADA score and the
opinion on Brown should be negative; after all, republicans
(closer to 0 in the ADA scale) should value Brown positively,
and democrats (closer to 100) should value him negatively.
The opposite should be true for Coakley and, thus, a positive
correlation should be expected. With regards to the ADA
score and the voting orientation they should also be negatively
correlated for the same reasons as ADA score vs opinion on
Brown.
Table V shows the results of this experiment. The different
scores do correlate as expected. However, the correlations are
very weak, showing that they are essentially orthogonal with
each other.
Based on these three experiments, we claim that the ac-
curacy of lexicon-based sentiment analysis when applied to
political conversation is quite poor. When compared against
manually labeled tweets it seems to just slightly outperform
a random classifier; it fails to detect and correctly assign
the intent behind disinformation and misleading propaganda;
and, finally, it’s a far cry from being able to predict political
preference.
Pearson’s r
Opinion on Brown vs Avg. ADA scores -0.150799848
Opinion on Coakley vs Avg. ADA scores +0.09304417
Voting orientation vs Avg. ADA scores -0.178902764
TABLE V
CORRELATION BETWEEN AVERAGED ADA SCORES (WHICH
PURPORTEDLY REFLECT USERS POLITICAL PREFERENCE) AND THE
OPINIONS ON THE TWO CANDIDATES AND THE VOTING ORIENTATION. THE
CORRELATIONS FOUND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE INITIAL HYPOTHESES
BUT VERY WEAK TO BE USEFUL.
C. Could we had done better than that?
The previous subsection reviewed how the methods pro-
posed to predict elections would have performed in several
instances using data from the 2010 US Congressional elec-
tions. These experiments were important because a wider set
of test cases was needed to base any claims of predictability
of elections through Social Media.
Given the unsuccessful predictions we report, one might
counter that “you would have done better if you did a different
kind of analysis”. However, recall that we did not try to invent
new techniques of analysis: We simply tried to repeat the
(reportedly successful) methods that others have used in the
past, and we found that the results were not repeatable.
IV. HOW TO PREDICT ELECTIONS
In the past, some research efforts have treated social media
as a black box: it may give you the right answer, though you
may not know why. We believe that there is an opportunity for
intellectual contribution if research methods are accompanied
with at least a basic reasonable model on why they would
predict correctly. Next we discuss some standards that electoral
predictions should obey in order to be repeatedly successful.
A. A method of prediction should be an algorithm.
This might seem as a trivial point, but it is not always
easy to follow when dealing with social media. Of course,
every election might seem different and adjustments in the data
collection and analysis may be necessary. Nevertheless, these
adjustments should be determinable before hand, because, as
Duncan Watts [23] argues in his recent book, they all seem
obvious afterwards.
More specifically, we propose that a method should clearly
describe before the elections: (a) the way in which the Social
Media data are to be collected, including the dates of data
collection, (b) the way in which the cleanup of the data is to
be performed (e.g., the selection of keywords relevant to the
election), (c) the algorithms to be applied on the data along
with their input parameters, and (d) the semantics under which
the results are to be interpreted.
The previous section observed that the currently available
tools for analyzing large volumes of data are not always
accurate. Sentiment analysis can get incorrect readings of
sentiment, because the complexity of human communication
cannot be easily described completely with a small set of
non-contradicting rules. Hoping that the errors in sentiment
analysis “somehow” cancel themselves out is not defensible.
B. Social Media Data are fundamentally different than Data
from Natural Phenomena.
In particular, Social Media allow manipulation by those who
have something to gain by manipulating them. Spammers and
propagandists write programs that create lots of fake accounts
and use them to tweet intensively, amplifying their message,
and polluting the data for any observer. It’s known that this
has happened in the past (e.g., [21], [24]). It is reasonable
that, if the image presented by social media is important to
some (advertisers, spammers, propagandists), there will likely
be people who will try to tamper with it.
This brings an important point in terms of selecting tools
for analysis. Using on social media data the same analytical
tools as one would use on data from natural phenomena may
not result in repeatable predictions. For example, the social
media metrics that post processing of candidates’ tweets found
to increase prediction rates [12], will not likely be the same
in the next elections. The candidates in the next elections will
certainly manipulate their tweets in a different manner and the
metrics that will increase predictability in the next elections
(if at all) will be different.
C. Form a testable theory on why and when it predicts.
Predicting elections with accuracy should not be supported
without some clear understanding of why it works. If a theory
to predict elections is to be identified, the research should be
able to explain why this is the case in a testable way, and not
treat it as a black box.
Related to this point is the establishment of a baseline for
successful predictions. A success rate for elections that is close
to chance is not an appropriate baseline, since they are trivial
ways of prediction that are much better than that. For example,
in 2008, incumbents won 91.6% of the races they run, and in
2010, at a time of reportedly major upsets, the incumbents
still won in 84.55% of the races they run. Since in the US
congressional elections about nine out of ten of the times the
incumbent wins, incumbency success rate is an appropriate
baseline (as also [12], [17] propose). Similarly, many electoral
districts are known to be consistently electing candidates from
the same party for years. Predictions performing below these
trivial baselines should not be considered competent.
D. Learn from the professional pollsters.
This last point is not a necessary one, but it is one way
through which predicting elections through social media could
work. In particular, prediction can come through correctly
identifying likely voters and getting an un-biased represen-
tative sample of them. That’s what professional pollsters have
been doing for the last 80 years, with mostly impressive re-
sults, but that’s something that today’s Social Media cannot do.
Below we describe the complexity of professional polling and
explain the reasons why their methods cannot be duplicated
by unsophisticated sampling of Social Media data.
Professional polling is based on statistically reliable sam-
pling and is able to prove why it is successful. There is a long
history of electoral predictions, and every year significant ef-
fort is made all over the world to making sure that predictions
are as close to electoral results as possible. Those involved in
this endeavor enjoy high visibility, fame when successful and
ridicule when not successful. All the experts in the field agree,
however, that the most important aspect of correct prediction
is the selection of a representative and unbiased sample of the
population.
Professional pollsters need to obtain a random sample of
the people who will actually vote, in order to achieve accurate
predictions. To do that, one needs both a method for random
sampling, and access to whoever the random sampling requires
to sample. Since one cannot always achieve this, one has to
be strive to come as close to this requirement as possible.
Since one cannot be sure about who will actually vote, the
prediction can be approximated by sampling those who will
likely vote. A typical approach considers the “likely voter”, as
one who has voted in the previous elections. This is so because
not every adult who has the right to vote will exercise it. For
example, in the 2000 presidential elections, if one sampled
randomly the registered voters – 80% of who actually voted,
one would be able to make far more accurate predictions than
one that sampled just the eligible adults – 52% of whom
actually voted [25]. A good random sampling method should
turn out samples of equal number of people to be sampled by
age group. However, the final calculation should not include
the sample results of each age group without age adjustment.
This is because in 2000, only 36% of citizens between the
ages 18 and 24 voted compared to 50% of those between 25
and 34 and 68% of those over 35.
Consider then the unfiltered sample which can be obtained
today from social media data, such as those provided by Twit-
ter, Facebook, Myspace or other popular social networking
services. To be comparable with the results of professional
pollsters, a correct sample from Twitter should be able to
identify the age range, voting eligibility and prior voting
pattern of the tweeters. However, there are currently no means
of collecting this information reliably, at least without intrusive
methods that compromise privacy. But even then, a really
random sample of the likely voters is still unattainable, because
only those who have an active Twitter account and have
decided to tweet about the election can be observed. Collecting
social media data today, is like going to a political rally
and sampling the people gathered there, expecting that it will
provide an accurate representation of the likely voters. Instead,
a highly biased sample will be found. It would not help much
to go to every political rally, because the large volume of voters
who attend no rally will still be missing.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This research has revealed that data from social media did
only slightly better than chance in predicting election results
in the last US Congressional elections. We argue that this
makes sense: So far, only a very rough estimation on the
exact demographics of the people discussing elections in social
media is known, while according to the state-of-the-art polling
techniques, correct predictions requires the ability of sampling
likely voters randomly and without bias. Moreover, answers
to several pertinent questions are needed, such as the actual
nature of political conversation in social media, the relation
between political conversation and electoral outcomes, and the
way in which different ideological groups and activists engage
and influence online social networks.
In this paper we have also described three necessary stan-
dards that any theory aiming to predict competently and
consistently elections using Social Media data should follow:
The prediction theory should be an algorithm with carefully
predetermined parameters, the data analysis should be aware
of the difference between social media data and natural
phenomena data, and it should contain some explanation on
why it works. We argue that one way to do that, would be
to establish a sampling method comparable to the ones used
by professional pollsters, though there are many obstacles in
doing so today.
In addition to that, further research is needed regarding the
flaws of simple sentiment analysis methods when applied to
political conversation. In this sense it would be very interesting
to understand the impact of different lexicons and to go one
step further by using machine learning techniques (such as
in the work by [2]). Also, there is a need for a deeper
understanding of the dynamics of political conversation in
social media (following the work of [26]).
Finally, we point out that our results do not argue against
having a strategy for involving social media in a candidate’s
election campaign. Instead, it argues that, just because a candi-
date is scoring high in some social media metrics (e.g., number
of Facebook friends or Twitter followers), this performance
does not guarantees electoral success.
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